Port 2000Cisco SCCP

The Cisco Skinny Client Control Protocol (SCCP), commonly referred to as Skinny, is a proprietary lightweight protocol developed by Cisco for use in their IP telephony solutions. It operates over TCP and UDP port 2000 to manage signaling between Cisco IP Phones and Cisco Unified Communications servers. SCCP facilitates call setup, teardown, feature negotiation, and device control within Cisco's VoIP ecosystem..

transport
tcp · udp

2 transports registered

in transit
cleartext

payload readable on path

assignment
official

registered with iana

risk
4/10

caution

lookups
8,993

rank 547 of 993 · top 55%

Technical Details

what runs on :2000

The Cisco Skinny Client Control Protocol (SCCP) is designed primarily for communication between Cisco IP phones and Cisco Unified Communications Managers (CUCM). Originally created by Selsius Corporation, SCCP was later acquired and further developed by Cisco, serving as the backbone signaling protocol in many Cisco call-processing environments. It enables lightweight communication by offloading much of the call control intelligence to CUCM, making IP phones simpler and more cost-effective.

SCCP messages are transmitted over TCP (and optionally UDP) port 2000, using a simple and efficient binary message format. The protocol supports functions such as registration, call signaling, feature negotiation, phone configuration updates, and media stream control. Because it is lightweight compared to other protocols like SIP or H.323, it is well-suited for environments with numerous endpoints.

While SCCP is proprietary and mostly limited to Cisco devices, it remains widely used within Cisco-dominated enterprise telephony networks. The protocol facilitates integration with Cisco's extensive suite of IP-based communication solutions, enabling features such as call forwarding, conferencing, voicemail access, and directory services.

Security Information

exposure of :2000

risk score

4/ 10caution

worth attention. how exposed you are depends on configuration — don't leave it reachable from the internet without a reason.

network services averages 3.9 across 604 ports — this one sits 0.1 above.

in transit

cleartext

credentials and payloads are readable by anyone on path

assignment

official

registered with iana for this service — scanners fingerprint it by number

reachable over

tcp · udp

udp is connectionless — source addresses are trivially spoofed and it is a reflection favourite

security overview

Common Vulnerabilities:

  • As a proprietary protocol, SCCP's security relies heavily on the underlying network protections; unencrypted transmissions can expose sensitive signaling information to attackers.
  • Man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks could intercept or manipulate calls and signaling data if network segmentation and encryption are not enforced.
  • Unauthorized endpoint registration or rogue devices could disrupt services or facilitate toll fraud if proper authentication is lacking.

Common Mitigations:

  • Enabling network-level segmentation using VLANs and ACLs to isolate IP telephony traffic from other parts of the infrastructure.
  • Implementing secure protocols and encryption (e.g., Secure Skinny) where supported, or tunneling SCCP traffic inside secure VPNs.
  • Enforcing strong authentication of endpoints and hardening CUCM configurations to prevent unauthorized device registration.
  • Regularly monitoring signaling traffic and system logs to detect anomalies, unauthorized access attempts, or abuse.

the 8 most looked-up other ports in network services — 604 ports carry that label.

risk mix of the 8 listed

  • caution100%

0 of 8 encrypted